People vs. Salas

Facts:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.

Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.

Held:

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecution, the accused

shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and

counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and

public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of

witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed

notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is

unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in

the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape.

The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a

result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.

As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the

fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had

not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows

trial in absentia,

 Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Doctrine:

 their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial.  They were to be deemed to have received notice.  The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law.