FACTS:
Jerry Moles(petitioner) bought from
Mariano Diolosa owner of Diolosa Publishing House a linotype printing
machine(secondhand machine). Moles promised Diolosa that will pay the full
amount after the loan from DBP worth P50,000.00 will be released. Private
respondent on return issued a certification wherein he warrated that the
machine was in A-1 condition, together with other express warranties. After the
release of the of the money from DBP, Petitioner required the Respondent to
accomplish some of the requirements. On which the dependant complied the
requirements on the same day.
On November 29, 1977, petitioner
wrote private respondent that the machine was not functioning properly. The
petitioner found out that the said machine was not in good condition as experts
advised and it was worth lesser than the purchase price. After several
telephone calls regarding the defects in the machine, private respondent sent two
technicians to make necessary repairs but they failed to put the machine in
running condition and since then the petitioner wan unable to use the machine
anymore.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether there is an
implied warranty of its quality or fitness.
2. Whether
the hidden defects in the machine is sufficient to warrant a rescission of the
contract between the parties.
FACTS:
1. It
is generally held that in the sale of a designated and specific article sold as
secondhand, there is no implied warranty as to its quality or fitness for the
purpose intended, at least where it is subject to inspection at the time of the
sale. On the other hand, there is also authority to the effect that in a
sale of secondhand articles there may be, under some circumstances, an implied
warranty of fitness for the ordinary purpose of the article sold or for the
particular purpose of the buyer.
Said general
rule, however, is not without exceptions. Article 1562 of our Civil Code,
which was taken from the Uniform Sales Act, provides:
"Art.
1562. In a sale of goods, there is an implied warranty or condition as to
the quality or fitness of the goods, as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose;"
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose;"
As already narrated, an expert witness for the petitioner categorically established that the machine required major repairs before it could be used. This, plus the fact that petitioner never made appropriate use of the machine from the time of purchase until an action was filed, attest to the major defects in said machine, by reason of which the rescission of the contract of sale is sought. The factual finding, therefore, of the trial court that the machine is not reasonably fit for the particular purpose for which it was intended must be upheld, there being ample evidence to sustain the same.
At a belated stage of this appeal, private respondent came up for the first
time with the contention that the action for rescission is barred by
prescription. While it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code
provides for a prescriptive period of six months for a redhibitory
action, a cursory reading of the ten preceding articles to which it refers will
reveal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties.
The present case involves one with an express warranty. Consequently, the
general rule on rescission of contract, which is four years shall apply.
Considering that the original case for rescission was filed only one year after
the delivery of the subject machine, the same is well within the prescriptive
period. This is aside from the doctrinal rule that the defense of
prescription is waived and cannot be considered on appeal if not raised in the
trial court, and this case does not have the features for an exception to said
rule.
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