Gimenez vs. Nazareno

Facts:

On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00 p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the  scheduled date of the first hearing the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.) while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez and Mercado filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's decision on the ground that it will render

nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance of the accused before the court.

Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present:

(1) that there has been an arraignment

 (2) that the accused has been notified;

 (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.

The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

Doctrine:

The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion.  Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly.  It should not wait for the fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest.  They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them