de la Torre vs. COMELEC

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)

Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.”

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstance