CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: 

Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held:  

Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned

EPZA VS CHR

Facts:

Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 the PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist fromdoing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion wasdismissed.EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue:

WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violatorsof human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.

Held:

The SC held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even aquasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the  Supreme Court .A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is granted.

CARINO VS. CHR

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Reodica vs. CA

Facts:

Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Norberto Bonsol causing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" witharresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court’s decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that

1. the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
2. reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
2. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless imprudence resultingto slight physical injuries are light felonies.
3. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.
4. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
5. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.
6. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:

1. On penalty imposed

The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor – see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).

The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would bearresto mayor in minimum and medium periods.

“Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365.  Imprudence and negligence.  – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1.            When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.”

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days.  If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies.  Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor

2. Classification of each felony involved

Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor.

Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

3. Rule on complex crime

Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.

4. Right to assail duplicity of information

Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived.

5. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.

Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:

1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC.

2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscal’s office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscal’s office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit

Facts:

Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.

A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties.  Such agreement states that they are to:

Par. 2.  Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.  This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.

E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.  Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.  At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.

Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government.  The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.

Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.  Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES

Facts:

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:

WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.

Held:

No.CdO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

Basco vs. PAGCOR

Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter— PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local autonomy.  Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

Issue:

 Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?

Held:

No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.   The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an “Imperium in imperio” it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government.  PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

METRO TRAFFIC vs. GONON

FACTS

The original complaint was filed by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Gonong issued a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction .The parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.

ISSUE:

1.     Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.

2.     Whether or not private respondent’s license can be confiscated.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petitionerits insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.

Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc. He claims that removal and confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed."

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either. "The first means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest.

2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As it has not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.

Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power ofsubordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.

Ordillo v. COMELEC

FACTS

- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.

- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.

- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably – then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”

- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.

- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.

- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.

- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose

b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUE

                WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELD

- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.

- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.

- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.

- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)

- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]

- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)

- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.

GANZON VS CA

FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued 3 successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant toSec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.”

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an   LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.  It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils,  that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao

FACTS:

Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE:

WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

HELD:

No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that  "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGU’s are juridical persons.

HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither being a critical project. The said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar. 

Abbas vs. COMELEC

Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Issue: 

Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.

Held: 

The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.

1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?

The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.