CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: 

Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held:  

Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned

EPZA VS CHR

Facts:

Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 the PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist fromdoing work on the area. EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion wasdismissed.EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint. EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).

Issue:

WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violatorsof human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.

Held:

The SC held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even aquasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining there from the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself hasno jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the  Supreme Court .A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. EPZA’s petition is granted.

CARINO VS. CHR

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions”to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Reodica vs. CA

Facts:

Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Norberto Bonsol causing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office against the petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries" witharresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court’s decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that

1. the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it can’t impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
2. reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
2. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and reckless imprudence resultingto slight physical injuries are light felonies.
3. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.
4. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
5. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.
6. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:

1. On penalty imposed

The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor – see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).

The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property amounting to 8,542.00 would bearresto mayor in minimum and medium periods.

“Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365.  Imprudence and negligence.  – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1.            When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.”

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days.  If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies.  Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor

2. Classification of each felony involved

Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to arresto menor.

Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

3. Rule on complex crime

Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.

4. Right to assail duplicity of information

Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived.

5. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.

Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:

1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC.

2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscal’s office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscal’s office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit

Facts:

Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.

A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties.  Such agreement states that they are to:

Par. 2.  Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.

Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people.  This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:

Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling:

The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.

E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.

The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.  Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.  At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.

Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government.  The bodies created by E. O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.

Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.  Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES

Facts:

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:

WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.

Held:

No.CdO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

Basco vs. PAGCOR

Facts:

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter— PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners claim that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is in violation of the principle of local autonomy.  Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

Issue:

 Does the local Government of Manila have the power to impose taxes on PAGCOR?

Held:

No, the court rules that The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes on PAGCOR.   The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply means decentralization. It cannot be an “Imperium in imperio” it can only act intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government.  PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.