Tuesday, April 21, 2015

METRO TRAFFIC vs. GONON

FACTS
The original complaint was filed by Dante S. David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He questioned the petitioner's act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

Judge Gonong issued a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction .The parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Judge Gonong held that LOI 43, which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it "to detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways." At any rate, he said, the LOI had been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.

ISSUE:
1.     Whether or not LOI 43 is valid.
2.     Whether or not private respondent’s license can be confiscated.

HELD:
1. Yes. The petitionerits insists that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only.

Private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD 1605, which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver's licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc. He claims that removal and confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of Rights against unlawful deprivation.

The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in violation of the traffic laws. A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the decree to "otherwise discipline" and "impose higher penalties" on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed."

It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes that "there is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one" and suggests a different treatment for either. "The first means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest.

2. No. It is not covered by LOI 43 thus subject to a different penalty. As it has not been shown that the private respondent's motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that "in case of traffic violations, (even) the driver's license shall not be confiscated," let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.


Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power ofsubordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.


Ordillo v. COMELEC

FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that “…Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably – then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.”
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.

ISSUE
                WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)

- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.

GANZON VS CA

FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in 1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc. Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government Luis T. Santos issued 3 successive 60- day suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant toSec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under the Code.”

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an   LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.  It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils,  that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao

FACTS:

Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE:
WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

HELD:
No.Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that  "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGU’s are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area neither being a critical project. The said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar. 

Abbas vs. COMELEC

Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Issue: 
Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.

Held: 
The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.



TOBIAS VS ABALOS


Facts:
As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 7675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district. Hon Congressional representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Issue:
1)       RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it contravenes the “one-subject-one bill” rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the Constitution (every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this section embraces two principal subjects 1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
2)       Second and third objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitioners argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has resulted in increase in the composition of the House of representatives and that it preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).

Held: Contentions are devoid of merit.  The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
1)       The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule, it should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with  such requirement is the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions germane to that general subject
2)       Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than 250 thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative proviso in the constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.
3)       The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment—therefore increase is not unconstitutional
4)       Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of legislative districts
5)       The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of mandaluyong

6)       On the issue of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong district-by dividing the district his constituency has in fact been diminished and not favorable to him